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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Kirk JuHiard Gosch appeals from the district court's order denying his
petition for post-conviction relief entered after an evidentiary hearing.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Gosch petitioned for post-conviction relief asserting a single claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.

(R., pp. 1-11, 22-24, 44-47, 55-58.)

Specifically, Gosch alleged that his attorneys talked him out of appealing his
manufacture of marijuana and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver
convictions by informing him that if he appealed the state would be able to re-file
a cocaine trafficking charge despite the fact the jury acquitted him of that charge
attrial. (R., p. 56-57; see also R., pp. 41-42.)
At the hearing on the petition Gosch testified, "If I was given the right
advice, I would have definitely appealed." (Tr., p. 12, Ls. 1-2.) He testified that
right after the trial he asked his attorney to file an appeal but that she told him if
Gosch appealed he would risk being charged with the cocaine charge again.
(Tr., p. 14, Ls. 1-9; p. 15, L. 7 - p. 16, L. 8.) Gosch testified, "That's why I didn't
file an appeaL" (Tr., p. 15, L. 22.) Gosch was the only plaintiff's witness. (Tr., p.
4.)

Gosch's criminal trial attorney testified when called by the defense. (Tr.,
p. 4.) She testified that Gosch had requested an appeal immediately after the
trial and she told him to schedule an appointment to discuss the appeal and what
issues to raise, but he never again contacted her about an appeal. (Tr., p. 34,
1

2 - p. 38, L. 15.) She denied ever having told Gosch that he could be

on

the cocaine trafficking count. (Tr., p. 40, ls. 9-23.)
After the evidentiary hearing petitioner's counsel argued that there were
"two avenues of relief." (Tr., p. 56, Ls. 2-3.) The first was that no appeal was
filed despite the post-verdict request and the second was that counsel had talked
Gosch out of the appeal based on an erroneous statement. (Tr., p. 56, Ls. 3-9.)
The prosecutor responded to both of these arguments in his closing. (Tr., p. 57,
L. 19-p. 59, L. 19.)

The district court entered the following findings of fact:
1.
The only time Petitioner expressed his desire to "appeal
everything" was walking to the Public Defender's Office, with his
attorneys, immediately after the verdict had been taken in CR-F05403.
2.
This expression of his desire to "appeal everything" occurred
prior to sentencing, and prior to judgment.
3.
This statement was made during a time of stress and
confusion for the petitioner, as he had learned of his verdict just
prior to making this statement.
4.
Upon expressing a desire to "appeal everything", Petitioner
was directed by his attorneys to contact them the next day by
scheduling an appointment.
5.
Petitioner was instructed to contact his counsel the next day
because his attorneys believed Petitioner was in a confused and
stressful state due to the recent verdict. Therefore, waiting a day
would allow Petitioner to digest the verdict, and more clearly
articulate what exactly he wanted to appeal.
6.
After the verdict Petitioner never scheduled an appointment,
nor spoke with his attorneys in regards to an appeal.
7.
The Public Defender's Office made several attempts to
contact Petitioner following his request to "appeal everything".
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8.
These attempts included an
to make available to
Petitioner the services of the Public Defender's Investigator, prior to
Petitioner's sentencing.
9.
Despite numerous attempts to contact Petitioner, however,
the Public Defender's Office was unsuccessful in its attempts to
reach him.
10.
At his sentencing, Petitioner was notified, in writing, of his
right to appeal.
(R., pp. 105-06.)

The district court concluded that, because the request to

"appeal everything" occurred "during a time of confusion and stress" and before
Gosch's appeal rights had vested, trial counsel had acted reasonably in trying to
arrange an appointment to discuss whether to ultimately pursue the appeal. (R.,
p. 109.) Petitioner's subsequent failure to follow up on an appeal resulted in an
inadequate communication of the desire to appeal by the time an appeal could
be filed.

(R., pp. 109-10.)

Because Gosch ignored repeated attempts by his

counsel to contact him, "[c]ounsel reasonably believed that Petitioner had
abandoned any desire to file an appeal." (R., p. 110.) The district court also
found that trial counsel had never informed Petitioner "that he could be retried on
the cocaine charge for which he was acquitted, if he filed an appeal." (R., p.
110.)
The district court entered judgment denying relief and dismissing the
petition with prejudice. (R., p. 112.) Gosch timely filed his notice of appeal. CR.,
p. 114.)
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ISSUE
Gosch states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Gosch's petition for
post-conviction relief?
(Appellant's brief, p. 11.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Gosch failed to show that the district court erred in concluding he had
failed to prove his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because Gosch does
not challenge the district court's finding that trial counsel reasonably concluded
Gosch had abandoned his desire for an appeal because of Gosch's actions?

4

Gosch Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Concluding He Had
Failed To Prove His Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel

A.

Introduction
The district court concluded that trial counsel reasonably concluded that

Gosch had abandoned his desire for an appeal between the time he requested
an appeal and the time when an appeal would actually have been filed. (R., p.
110.) Gosch does not dispute this. (See generally Appellant's brief.) Having
failed to even address the core of the district court's findings and analysis, Gosch
has failed to show error. 1

B.

Standard Of Review
A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, the allegations upon which his claim is based.
Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430,436,725 P.2d 135,141 (1986); Clark v. State, 92
Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); I.C.R. 57(c). When the district court
conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters findings of fact and conclusions of
law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they are clearly
erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the district court
from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729730 (1998). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their
testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters

The state concedes that it waived any objection that the trial court was deciding
an issue beyond the scope of the pleadings. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 14-16.)
1
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solely within the province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95,
97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003). A trial court's decision that a postconviction petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled to great weight.
Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939,940,792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990).

C.

Gosch Has Failed To Show That He Proved Either Deficient Performance
Or Prejudice
The parties both agree that the applicable legal authority in this case is

Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000). (See Appellant's brief, pp. 16-17.)
In that case Flores-Ortega applied for habeas corpus relief on the basis that his
attorney had failed to file a timely appeal. Roe, 528 U.S. at 474-75. The trial
court found that there was no consent to a failure to file an appeal, but that
Flores-Ortega had also failed to show a specific request for an appeal.

kL.

The

Ninth Circuit held that lack of consent to not file an appeal was sufficient to show
deficient performance where an appeal was not filed.

kL. at 475-76.

The Supreme Court applied the two prong test of Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), where the petitioner must show both deficient
performance and prejudice. Roe, 528 U.S. at 476-77. The Court rejected the
Ninth Circuit application of the deficient performance prong of the test requiring
counsel to obtain an affirmative waiver of the right to appeal. 1.9..: at 478. The
Court stated that there was a spectrum of performance from a lawyer who
disregards his client's express wishes to appeal and is therefore deficient at one
end to the lawyer who respects his client's wishes to not appeal and is therefore
not deficient at the other.

1.9..: at 477. The Court held that "counsel has a
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constitutionally imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal when
there is reason to

either (1) that a rational defendant

want to appeal

... , or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that
he was interested in appealing."

~

at 480. "In making this determination, courts

must take into account all the information counsel knew or should have known."
~

Gosch failed to show, based on all the information counsel knew or should
have known, that counsel failed in her duty to consult with him about a potential
appeal. Gosch presented no proof to the district court, and makes no argument
on appeal, that "a rational defendant would want to appeal" the judgment in his
case. Instead Gosch appears to argue that because he stated a specific desire
to appeal after the trial the evidence showed that "this particular defendant
reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing."
However, when counsel instructed Gosch, who appeared very emotional at the
time, to contact her office and make an appointment to discuss an appeal Gosch
did not do so, made no further effort to talk to his counsel about an appeal, and
reasonable efforts to contact Gosch also failed. Thus, the trial court's finding that
counsel, based on the information available to her at the time to file the appeal,
reasonably concluded that Gosch had abandoned his desire shows no deficient
performance under the Roe standard.
Gosch argues that counsel no longer had a duty to consult with him, but
instead had an absolute duty to file an appeal, because Gosch affirmatively
requested an appeal.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 17-20.)
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By considering events

between the request

appeal, argues Gosch, the district

court erroneously "grafted additional requirements onto [the Sixth Amendment]
standards." (Appellant's brief,

17.) It is Gosch, not the district court, that is

applying a legally incorrect standard, however. The Supreme Court of the United
States requires the trial court to "take into account all the information counsel
knew or should have known." Roe, 528 U.S. at 480 (emphasis added). This the
district court did when it considered events and actions between the end of the
trial (when Gosch expressed a desire to appeal) and the entry of the judgment
(which triggered the ability to appeal). Gosch's argument that the district court
was required to ignore some or even most of the information known to counsel at
the time the appeal could have been filed is contrary to applicable law.
In this case Gosch stated his desire to appeal at a time of high emotion,
just after being convicted of two felony marijuana charges. 2 (R., pp. 105, 109.)
This clearly triggered counsel's duty to consult with her client about an appeal.
Roe, 528 U.S. at 480. It did not trigger the duty to file an appeal because no
appeal was ripe prior to entry of judgment. (R., p. 109.) Counsel fulfilled her
duty to consult about an appeal by instructing Gosch to make an appointment for

The state believes a reasonable interpretation of the evidence is that Gosch
was particularly interested in appealing the district court's ruling allowing the
state to withdraw from a plea agreement (Tr., p. 36, Ls. 6-21), but he was told
that if he prevailed a possession of cocaine charge would necessarily have been
reinstated to complete the bargain and therefore reinstating the plea agreement
might also result in a longer sentence (Tr., p. 37, Ls. 2-24). Thus, an appeal
specifically requesting enforcement of the plea agreement might have
effectuated a double jeopardy waiver and possibly a greater sentence. This
information convinced Gosch that an appeal was not in his best interests. (Tr., p.
15, L. 7 - p. 16, L. 3.)
2
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that very purpose, and then even trying to follow up by contacting Gosch
failed to make such an appointment.

(R., pp. 106, 109.) The reason no

consultation occurred was Gosch's inaction. (R., p. 109.) "[Taking] into account

a/l the information counsel knew or should have known," Roe, 528 U.S. at 480
(emphasis added), the district court properly concluded that counsel "reasonably
believed that [Gosch] had abandoned any desire to file an appeal" (R., p. 110).
Because the district court properly concluded, based on the unchallenged
findings of fact, that Gosch's own conduct had prevented consultation on the
issue of whether to file an appeal, which led to the reasonable conclusion that
Gosch was no longer interested in pursuing an appeal, Gosch has failed to show
that he proved that counsel's performance was deficient.
Gosch likewise failed to prove prejudice. To show prejudice Gosch had
the burden of proving that, "but for counsel's deficient performance, he would
have appealed."

Roe, 528 U.S. at 484. This standard "mirrors the prejudice

inquiry" applied in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), requiring the petitioner to
"show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to tria!." Roe,
528 at 485 (internal quotation marks omitted). To prove deficient performance a
petitioner may rely on evidence of nonfrivolous grounds for appeal and "evidence
that he sufficiently demonstrated to counsel his interest in the appea!."

~

at 486.

"But such evidence alone is insufficient to demonstrate that, had the defendant
received reasonable advice from counsel about the appeal, he would have
instructed his counsel to file an appeal."

~
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Here Gosch presented evidence

court had in fact made

rulings he could have challenged on appeal. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1-3.) Such is true
of every case, however. Gosch did not demonstrate below, or argue on appeal,
how appellate challenges to those rulings would have been nonfrivolous.
Likewise, although he presented evidence that he had in fact expressed a desire
for an appeal he presented no evidence that he would have continued in that
desire had he actually made and kept an appointment with counsel to discuss the
matter. In fact, Gosch himself admitted that he did abandon his desire to appeal,
albeit he claimed he did so based on incorrect advice. (Tr., p. 15, L. 22 - p. 16,

L. 3 ("That's why I didn't file an appeal.").) In short, Gosch failed to prove any
prejudice.
On appeal Gosch assumes that he is entitled to prevail because he
presented evidence, and the court found, that he had expressed his desire to
appeal to counsel after the trial. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-21.) In fact he accuses
the district court of disregarding the law by looking at any fact other than his
expression of a desire for an appeal. (Appellant's brief, p. 17.) The correct legal
standard, however, required the trial court to consider all of the information
available to counsel, not just the one fact. It also required Gosch to prove that he
would have persisted in his desire to appeal after reasonable consultation, a
burden not met below and unmentioned on appeal.

Gosch has failed to show

error in the district court's determination that trial counsel's performance was not
deficient for not filing an appeal when counsel "reasonably believed that [Gosch]
had abandoned any desire to file an appeal." (R., p. 110.) He has also failed to
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that he presented evidence, much

proof

prejudice.

For these

reasons, Gosch has failed to show error in the district court's determination that
Gosch had failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
and judgment denying Gosch's petition for post-conviction relief.

DATED this 3rd day of February, 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 28th day of September 2011, served
a true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
SARAH E. TOMPKINS
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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